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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
FRED D. HUDSON, dba Hudson Investment Co.,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No.

vs.

10378

BETTILYON'S INC., a corporation, dba
Bettilyons Construction Company,

Defendant and Respondant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by the Plaintiff to collect
funds due to him under a contract originally executed.
between the Defendant and one Lynn Gowans, dba
Structural Components Company, for installation of a
roof structure on a building at 2220 South 2nd West,
Salt Lake City, Utah. This contract was assigned by Lynn
Gowans to the Plaintiff. The Defendant separately 1.Uldertook and agreed to make "all checks and payments due
on the above job payable to Hudson Investment Company
and Structural Components Company, together, and that
no payments on this job would be made in any other
manner.' The Plaintiff claims to be the beneficiary of
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the orginal contract and accordingly to be entitled to the
proceeds. The Plaintiff claims also to be entitled to its
damages on a different legal theory, namely because the
Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a direct contractual
relationship regarding the manner in which the checks
would be made payable and that the breach of this contractual agreement by the Defendant and respondant
has given rise to the damages which the Plaintiff claims
he is entiled to recover.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After hearing the evidence, the Honorable Judge
Stewart M. Hanson issued a memorandum decision on
March 25, 1965, denying to the Plaintiff his sought-after
relief on the grounds that Gowans assigned the
"earnings" only, that the Plaintiff was paid; and that in
any event, the Defendant would be entiled to the benefit
of Rule 13 (j) of the Utah State of Civil Procedure. The
judgment of April 5, 1965, followed the same thinking
as the memorandum decision and granted to the Defendant judgment of no cause of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Plaintiff seeks to have the judgment of the lower
court reversed and to have judgment entered his favor
and against the Defendant in pursuance of the prayer of
his complaint together with the costs of this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Based upon Exhibit 4, and not upon any independent
knowledge of the Plaintiff, it appears that Bettilyon
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Construction Company, the general contractor for Freeway Industrial Park, had apparently undertaken to construct an office and warehouse at 2220 South 2nd West
'
Salt Lake City, Utah.
On or about the 28th day of September, 1962, Bettilyon
Construction Company entered into a sub-contract agreement with Lynn Gowans dba Structural Components
Company, for the construction of a Glu-Lam roof
structure, complete as "Shown on plans" and for furnishing other items, and services as provided in Paragraph
No. 2 of said agreement. The general contractor agreed to
pay the sub-contractor the sum of $30,482.00 for his
services.
On or about the 25th day of October, 1962, the subcontractor ran short of cash and came to the Plaintiff
to see if the Plaintiff would advance him some money.
After exhibiting Exhibit D-4 to the Plaintiff, Mr. Gowans
persuaded the Plaintiff, after some discussion, that a loan
of $3,750.00, based upon the security of the sub-contract
with Bettilyon's Inc. would be a sound investment.
Mr. Gowans was not a credit-worthy individual, so the
requested advance was initially declined, however, Mr.
Gowans persisted and was successful in obtaining the
signature of Mr. B. Lue Bettilyon on the document
marked Exhibit P-9 in this case, entitled "Assignment
of Earnings." After two or three attempts, Mr. Hudson
was able to reach Mr. Bettilyon to verify that he, Mr.
Bettilyon had signed this document. (P-9)
Later on, a partial disbursement of $15,300.00 was
made by Bettilyon's on the contract. The disbursing check
(Exhibit D-2) was made payable to Structural Com-

4
ponents and Hudson Investment Company, and upon
Gowans insistance that he needed all of the money, he
induced the Plaintiff to endorse the check to him without
receiving any portion of the proceeds. The Plaintiff was
assured that this $15,300.00 was only part payment; that
it was needed to meet the payroll; that the job would be
completed shortly and that the Plaintiff would be paid
out of the final payment on the contract. (see page 6 of
the transcript) The Plaintiff had already verified that no
money previous to this check had been disbursed on the
contract (see Page 4 of the Transcript). This would have
meant that at the time the first check was released that
there was $15,182.00 still owing on the contract to the
Plaintiff and Gowans by the Defendant.
Incidently, Gowans obtained an additional loan of
$2,150.00 from the Plaintiff on November 29, 1962, in
order to meet the payroll on this very job. Since this
second note was paid directly by Gowans, by Mr. Gowan's
check, it does not enter into this law suit, even though
it was also secured by an assignment of the same contract.
(See Exhibit D-10)
There is in evidence (Exhibit D-8) a so-called "Notice
of Lien." There may be two schools of thought as to
whether this Exhibit is competent evidence to prove the
facts which appear on its face. But giving the Defendant
every benefit of the doubt, it appears that commencing at
some time between November 12, 1962, and December
12, 1962, the first and last dates mentioned on the Notice
of Lien, that General Builders Supply Company, Inc.,
delivered some materials to Lynn Gowans which were
used on the subject job for which Mr. Gowans did not
pay completely.
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Mr. Gowans paid off part of the lien himself, however,
(See Transcript, Page 18, Line 5) because Bettilyons
was able to get a full release of that lien from General
Builders Supply for only $15,186.06.
There is on the reverse side of the contract a paragraph,
Number 13, which provides inter alia "the Subcontractor
agrees to satisfy immediately any lien or encumbrance ...
and to indemnify and save harmless the Contractor from
and against any and all liens, suits, claims, actions, losses,
costs, penalties, and damages of whatsoever kind of
nature, including attorney's fees, etc."
The reverse side of the contract bears no signature,
also the phrase on the face of the contract which makes
reference to the reverse side of the contract appears
underneath the signatures of the parties. Whether or not
the reverse side of the sub-contract agreement forms a
part of the Bettilyons-Gowans contract, the Defendants
are claiming the benefits Paragraph 13 of the same in
avoiding payment to the Plaintiff.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PARTIES INTENDED TRI-LATERALLY THAT
THE PLAINTIFF WOULD BE THE JOINT PAYEE OF
ALL GROSS PROCEEDS PAYABLE UNDER THE
TERMS OF THE CONTRACT.
Since this is a factual conclusion, no cases are cited.
This proposition rests upon logic and good sense, and
not law, and the only law that can be cited on this point
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is that the courts will lend to words their ordinary and
usual, not technical, meaning in interpreting contracts,
and further that the intent of the parties may be derived
from their over-all understanding and their actions as
well as the singular meaning of words used in expressng
an agreement.
True, the asignment is couched in words which say that
Gowans "assigned all my (his) earnings." Taken by
itself, the word "earnings" lends itself to a variety of
meanings. The agreement was drafted by laymen, apparently by Mr. Gowans himself, to which Mr. Bettilyon
added the second paragraph before signing.
Had the parties used the words "gross receipts" or
"net profit" there could be no room for argwnent, but
since they didn't, the problem becomes one of secondguessing the intent of the parties at the time the transaction was negotiated.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "Earnings" as:
"That which is earned; money earned; the price of
services performed; reward; the reward of labor or
the price of personal service performed, the reward
for personal services, whether in money or chattels,
the fruit or reward of labor; the fruits of the proper
skill, experience, and industry; the gains of a person
derived from his services or labor without the aid
of capital; money or property gained or merited by
labor; service, or the performance of something; that
which is gained or merited by labor, services, or performances. Saltzman v. City of Council Bluffs, 214
Iowa 1033, 243, N. W. 161, 162."

"Income" is synonymous with "earnings." State ex
rel. Froedtert Grain and Malting Co. v. Tax Com-
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mission of Wisconsin, 221 Wis. 225, 265 N. W. 672,
673, 104 A. L. R. 1478 (Emphasis mine)
(Earnings are)
"Either gross or net earnings" Springfield Coal
Mining Co. v. Industrial Commision, 126 NE 133, 22
ALR 859."
Black's Law Dictionary goes on to cite cases which
define "gross earnings" and which define "net earnings"
but leaves us with the conclusion that the general term
'earnings," means either gross or net earnings. Also, if
"earnings" is synonymous with income, it is also synonymous with receipts.
Mr. B. Lue Bettilyon gave some interesting testimony
to the effect that Mr. Gowans' profits on this job would
be about 25% of the gross. However, this don't seem to
be a factor at the time he issued the $15,300.00 check to
Mr. Gowans and Mr. Hudson on December 20, 1962. The
"net Profit" interpretation of "earnings" didn't seem to
enter anyone's mind at this time, and having seen the
willingness of Mr. Bettilyon to abide by his original
agreement, Mr. Hudson was willing to wait for the
second installment to get his money from Mr. Gowans.
Obviously, each party is attempting, on hindsight, to persuade the court to adopt the meaning of "earnings"
most favorable to its respective position, since the loser
must look to Mr. Gowans to be made whole, and since
Mr. Gowans has taken bankruptcy, the only hope of
effecting a recovery is upon the basis that Mr. Gowans
did not include Bettilyon's Inc. as one of his creditors,
and that the indemnity agreement is still good, a fact
not disclosed by the record.
Furthermore, the "gross receipts" definition, as opposed
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to the "net profit" definition of earnings, is bolstered by
the somewhat redundant, but meaningul language of
the next paragraph, which says that "Bettilyon Construction Company agrees to make all checks and payments due on the above herein described job payable
to Hudson Investment Company and Structural Components Company, together, and that no payments on
this job will be made in any other manner." (See Exhibit
P-9)
It will be argued later that this second paragraph
forms an independent, enforceable contract, but for the
purpose of clarifying this point, its importance is in
lending emphasis to the intent of the parties that the
gross proceeds would be paid to the joint order of the
Plaintiff and Mr. Gowans.

POINT II
THERE WAS A SEPARATE, VALID, AND ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF AND
DEFENDANT IN THIS ACTION.
Strangely enough, the obligor under the contract with
Gowans obligated itself to the Plaintiff by an independent
contract. This is not usual in assignment situations. All
that usually happens is that the benefits of a contract
are assigned, and the obligor is notified of the assignment.
This is all that is necessary to vest in the assignee the
rights of the assignor. However, in the instance, probably as an abundence of caution, the assignee, Fred D.
Hudson, procured from B. Lue Bettilyon, the President
of Bettilyon's Inc., not only an assent but also an independent agreement that all (not just some) checks and pay-
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ments .... would be made payable to Husdon Investment
Company and Structural Components Company together.
All that is necessary to give rise to a cause of action
to enforce such an agreement is the capacity of the parties
to contract, a meeting of the minds, a valid consideration,
a breach, and damages. All the elements of a separate
contract are present here, and need not be belabored.
The parties had an unquestioned abilty and capacity to
contract. The meeting of the minds is in writing. The
Plaintiff was induced to part with his money based upon
the agreement with Bettilyon's, Inc., Bettilyons breached
its contract to Hudson's damage, as claimed.
POINT III
THE PLAINTIFF NEVER RECEIVED PAYMENT OF
THE NOTE IN QUESTION.
The trial court held, as one of the reasons for its decision, that the Plaintiff had been paid. The basis of this
conclusion of fact is not entirely clear. It is possible that
there was confusion about the fact that there were two
notes. The second, smaller, note was admittedly paid.
That isn't what this law suit is about. It is about the first
note, the $3,750.00 note, not the $2,150.00 note. It could
also be that some value is placed on the fact that Mr.
Hudson endorsed the first $15,300.00 check. There is some
confusion as to whether Mr. Husdon and Mr. Bettilyon
made contact on this occasion (the contact with Mr.
Bettilyon having been handled by Dave Watkiss, Mr.
Hudson's attorney) but there can be no argument with
the fact that Mr. Hudson received no part of the proceeds
of the first check. Both Mr. Hudson and Mr. Gowas
testified to that, and there is not one iota of evidence to
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sustain a contrary position. This fact stands unrefuted.
Payment or non-payment is a fact and is not something
akin to hocus-pocus which may be inferred from endorsement of a check. An endorsement may be some evidence of payment, but certainly any presumptions that
may arise therefrom are rebuttable, and having clearly
rebutted the same, the fact of non-payment is unassailable.
POINT IV
THE PLAINTIFF'S RECOVERY IS NOT BARRED BY
RULE 13 (j) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Rule 13 (j) gives some protection to an obligor against
the claims of an assignee if the obligor had a claim,
counterclaim, or cross claim against the obligee-assignor
at the time of or before the notice of assignment. No one
argues with this proposition. It simply doesn't apply to
the facts of this case.
The Defendant argues that since Mr. Gowans didn't
pay General Builders Supply Company, Inc. for some
of the materials that were used on the job, that it had a
claim against Mr. Gowans under paragraph 13 of the
sub-contract agreement. While there may still be some
argument as to whether the back side of this agreement,
which begins with the caption "The Subcontractor
Agrees as Follows", but which bears no signature,
is a part of the contract, for the purpose of argument,
assume that it does form a part of the agreement
between Bettilyons and Mr. Gowans. The only defect
in the Defendant's reasoning is the timing. The
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cause of action by Bettilyon's against Mr. Gowans
did not begin to accrue until November 12, 1962. They
probably didn't know about their cause of action until
the notice of lien was recorded on February 18, 1963,
otherwise they wouldn't have paid Mr. Gowans
$15,300.00 on December 20, 1962. Even then it is doubtful. But sometime prior to April 8, 1963, they must have
discovered it (the date of the release), and paid the same.
Had Mr. Gowans not assigned his contract to Mr. Hudson
and had Bettilyon's not agreed to make all checks jointly
payable to Mr. Gowans and Mr. Hudson, there would be
less question about the right of Bettilyons to withhold
this money from Mr. Gowans. Even if their indemnification agreement were no good, they would be protected
at common law by some other rule against any claims of
Mr. Gowans.
Here we have a different situation however. There
are rights of third parties intervening. '.Dhat is the reason
for the language of the rule, establishing a cut-off date
for claims, etc., against the assignor. This cut-off date is
the time of or before notice of assignment. A simple
summary of the sequence of events will establish clearly
that there was no set-off, claim, or counterclaim against
Mr. Gowans at the time of the assignment. Mr. Hudson's
transaction with Mr. Gowans and Bettilyons was on
October 25, 1962. The cause of action in favor of Bettilyons against Mr. Gowans began to accrue on November
12, 1962, and had not fully accrued until December 12,
1962, and had not become a cause of action until February 18, 1963. The counterclaim, even if valid, is simply
too late to afford the Defendant any protection under
Rule 13 (j).
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the
trial court is erroneous on all three theories and that the
Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the Defendants
h

John Elwood Dennett, Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant,
1243 East 2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Mailed 2 copies of the foregoing to Verden E. Bettilyon, Attorney for Defendant-Appellant, 336 South 300

East, Salt

ity, Utah, this ........ Day of August, 1965.

